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ABSTRACT
Does Auditor Busyness 
influence Audit Outcome?: 
Further evidence
by
LAU Sze Man
Master o f Philosophy
Previous studies examining whether and how auditor busyness influences audit 
outcome use auditors’ clientele size as a proxy for auditor busyness. The result of these 
studies may be biased due to the endogeneity arising from the selection of clients by 
auditors as well as the selection of auditors by clients. By leveraging on the natural 
disasters as exogenous events to clients, I study whether the auditor busyness, induced 
by the additional assurance work performed for disaster-affected clients, influences 
the audit outcome of the non-disaster-affected clients (i.e.: the remaining clients). 
Consistent with the Limited Attention Theory (Cherry, 1953; Kahneman, 1973), I find 
auditor busyness is associated with a lower audit quality and a higher likelihood of 
non-timely filing o f engagements with non-disaster-affected clients. I also find that 
auditors with a concentration of busyness, induced by the insufficient time on audit 
planning, the constraints in audit resources and the lack o f industrial knowledge/prior 
audit experience, are associated with an even lower audit quality of engagements with 
their non-disaster-affected clients. The results are robust to different audit quality 
proxies and the additional test which further control for the audit firm individual effect. 
This study, using a new identification strategy of busy auditor, adds to the debate on 
the consequence o f auditor busyness.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The effect of auditor busyness on audit outcome has recently attracted the attention in 
accounting literature fLopez and Peters 2012; Sundgren and Svanstrom 2014: Bills. 
Swanquist and Whited 2016; Goodwin and Wu 2016: Guh Ma. and Lai 20171. 
Understanding whether and how the auditor busyness influences audit outcome is not 
only o f the interest of academics but also o f practitioners and regulators. However, the 
discussion is not yet conclusive as previous studies show mixed evidence. For example, 
using Australian data, Goodwin and Wu (2016) suggest, under equilibrium condition, 
auditor busyness and audit quality are not significantly associated, which indicates that 
at equilibrium busyness o f auditors does not affect audit quality. In contrast, based on 
Chinese data, Gul et al. (2017) suggest auditor busyness and audit quality are 
negatively associated.
In this project, I examine the causal relationship between the auditor busyness and 
audit outcome at the audit office level using three audit outcome proxies, namely audit 
quality, timely filing and audit costs. My study is important for two reasons. First, the 
current literature tends to measure auditor busyness based on clientele size, which is 
subject to endogeneity arising from the selection of clients by auditors as well as the 
selection o f auditors by clients. Thus, the inference drawn from such studies can be 
biased. For example, capable audit partners/offices would be better in resource 
allocation and able to handle multiple clients simultaneously. And thus, capable audit 
partners/offices choose to have a larger client portfolio to maximize their benefits. One, 
therefore, cannot interpret the positive association between clientele size and audit 
quality as auditor busyness increases audit quality. Second, it is essential to have a 
better understanding o f the effect o f auditor busyness at the audit office level. Wallman 
(19961 calls for attention to the importance of focusing on the office level when
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assessing the auditor independence effect on the audit quality, as a local office is an 
important decision unit during the audit decision process (Choi, Kim, Kim, and Zang 
2010). By leveraging on the natural disasters as exogenous events to clients, I study 
whether the busyness of an audit office, induced by the additional assurance work 
performed for disaster-affected clients, affects the audit outcome of the remaining 
clients o f that audit office. Since natural disasters are random by its very nature, they 
may affect companies located in different states in different time period, lending to 
randomization on the likelihood of having affected clients in a client portfolio. The 
additional efforts demanded for auditors’ works on assuring the reported items related 
to natural disasters serve as exogenous shocks to the auditors’ attention. I, therefore, 
believe this identification strategy can circumvent the selection problem associated 
with the common measures o f auditor busyness that are prevalent in the literature 
(Goodwin and Wu 2016: Gul et al. 2017).
It is shocking to know the number o f headlines related to severe damage caused by 
natural disasters around the world in the past few years. For example, in 2017 at the 
United States, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) had made 60 
major disaster declarations, which included (but not limited to) hurricane, tornadoes, 
wildfires, and flooding. In those 60 major disasters, hurricanes Irma and Harvey were 
one o f the costliest disasters to hit the U.S. (To Craven 2017). with close to US$200 
billion damage as estimated by Moody's Analytics (Allen and Davis 2017). Since 
companies domiciled in the affected regions may suffer from the impact o f natural 
disasters, it is of stakeholders’ interest to be better informed about the financial 
implication on those affected companies. Therefore, US GAAP requires SEC 
registrants who are suffered from the impact of natural disasters (hereafter called
affected clients) to estimate and recognize the effect of natural disasters in the financial
2
report, such as impairments, collectables, and contingency losses. As a result, audit 
engagements of affected clients would need more attention and effort from auditors in 
order to assure the items related to the impact of natural disasters are reported truly 
and fairly.
In this study, I define an audit office1 with at least one engagement with affected client 
in a year as a busy auditor. Conversely, I define an audit office without engagement 
with affected client in a year as a non-busy auditor. With a sample o f company-year 
observations from 2000-2013 of non-affected clients audited by non-affected audit 
offices (both busy and non-busy audit offices), I find that the audit outcome of 
engagements with non-affected clients is influenced by the busyness o f its audit office. 
In particular, auditor busyness is negatively associated with audit quality, positively 
associated with the likelihood of non-timely filing and no effect on the audit fees of 
engagements with non-affected clients. I also examine whether and how the audit 
outcome is influenced by the concentration o f busyness, measured by i) the insufficient 
time on audit planning induced by last quarter disasters, ii) the resources constraints 
induced by non-Big 4 offices, high concertation o f affected clients and clients suffered 
from severe disasters, and iii) the lack o f experience induced by the first audit 
engagement and the non-industrial specialist audit office. And I find that busy offices 
with concertation of busyness are associated with an even lower audit quality of 
engagements with its non-affected clients. The results are robust to alternative audit 
quality proxies and an additional test which further control for the audit firm 
characteristics.
11 identify each audit office based on the address of audit office available on Audit Analytics.
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This study has several contributions. First, it contributes to the unsettled discussion on 
the effect o f auditor busyness on audit outcome. While Goodwin and Wu (20161 show 
that auditor busyness is not associated with a deterioration in audit quality under 
equilibrium condition, Gul et al. (2017) show that auditor busyness significantly 
impedes audit quality. This study adds to the discussion on the consequence o f auditor 
busyness.
Second, current literature related to auditor busyness focuses on the characteristic o f 
auditors’ client portfolio, in which the association between auditor busyness and audit 
outcome may be biased due to selection problem. Different from the previous studies, 
this study takes advantage of the exogenous event -  the additional audit work caused 
by the impact of natural disasters on disaster-affected clients, to examine the causal 
relationship between auditor busyness and audit outcome. Since the likelihood of 
impact by natural disasters is out o f auditors and clients’ control, using the busyness 
effect induced by natural disasters to proxy for auditor busyness creates randomization 
and rules out a spurious relationship by factors that influence both auditor busyness 
and audit outcome.
Third, the study is of important practical implication. In the view o f natural disasters, 
regulators may consider the necessity to extend the filing deadline for SEC registrants 
who suffer from the impact o f natural disasters. Since auditors have to make more 
effort in assuring those reported items related to the impact o f natural disasters, 
extending the filing period would relax the resource constraints and most importantly 
maintain the audit quality o f the non-affected clients o f busy auditors.
The remainder of the paper is in the following structure: Section 2 discusses the 
institutional background and hypothesis development, Section 3 provides details o f the
4
research design, Section 4 presents the results o f the main association, Section 5 
presents the results of robustness tests and additional analysis, and Section 6 concludes 
the paper.
2. INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
2.1. Financial reporting implications of natural disasters
As Dennis Howell, a senior consultation partner in Deloitte, mentioned in a journal 
interview, the financial reporting implications of natural disasters is o f high awareness 
to the SEC registrants fCohn 2017b The accounting association and practitioners 
recently published various documents related to the issue (AICFA 2017: Deloitte & 
Touche LLP 2017: Ernst & Young LLP 2017; PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP 2017). In 
particular, those publications include the guidance on asset impairments, accounting 
and disclosure requirements related to the impact of natural disasters.
As required by the US GAAP, the companies who were suffered from damages caused 
by natural disasters are required to pay special attention to the followings. First, they 
have to evaluate whether the natural disaster is an extraordinary event2. Second, they 
are required to determine the value o f destroyed assets to be written off. For example, 
the company should evaluate whether their inventory3 and property, plant and 
equipment4 5are obsoleted or damaged due to the impact of natural disasters, and assess
2 With reference to ASC 225 —  Income Statement
3 With reference to ASC 330 —  Inventory
4 With reference to ASC 360 —  Property, Plant, and Equipment
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whether natural disasters trigger a goodwill impairment5. Third, they have to disclose 
the insurance claim made and expected insurance recoveries5 6.
In the meantime, auditors, who have engagements with affected clients, have to discuss 
with the client’s audit committee and provide additional information regarding the 
scope and result o f audit. To maintain their independence, auditors are prohibited from 
contributing to the financial report preparation. Instead, they are responsible for 
assuring both the recognized losses and estimated loss contingencies7 in the financial 
statements during the audit procedure. Also, auditors are responsible for evaluating 
whether the affected client has a substantial doubt to continue the operation and 
business following the guidance provided by PCAOB (Auditing Standards no.2415) 
and AICPA (Professional Standards AU-C Section 570). Since the reported items 
related to natural disasters are relatively large and mainly based on managers’ 
estimation, the inherent risk for audit engagements with affected clients would increase. 
Auditors have to expand the scope o f audit and collect more audit evidence to assure 
the loss and insurance claim are properly classified and recorded, to lower the risk of 
restatement, and to reveal any unreasonably large losses that possibly subject to 
managers’ big bath behavior. In other words, auditors with affected clients have to 
make more effort, in the form of time, attention and professional judgment, on the 
audit engagements for affected clients than those for other non-affected clients.
5 With reference to ASC 350 — Intangibles - Goodwill and Other
6 With reference to ASC 410 —  Asset Retirement and Environmental Obligations and ASC 605 —  
Revenue Recognition
7 With reference to ASC 450 —  Contingencies, companies have to disclose an estimate of potential 
losses if  the liabilities have not yet been recognized.
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2.2. Prior literature on limited attention and performance
Studies examine the detrimental effect of the busy situation from the limited attention 
perspective. Researchers in cognitive psychology suggest that attention is a scarce 
resource. When a person pays attention to one task, it would reduce his / her ability to 
process other information, and undermine his/her performance in other tasks if  those 
tasks happen simultaneously and require the same cognitive effort ('Cherry 1953; 
Kahneman 19731. We could simply imagine that a person will be distracted and need 
a longer reaction time if  he/she tries to send text messages while driving. Following 
this line o f research, various researches in accounting and finance literature emphasize 
the detrimental effect of busy situation in different contexts. One stream of research 
examines the busyness effect on investors’ performance. Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) 
model investors’ attention on firms’ discretion on information presented in accounting 
reports. Based on the theory o f limited attention, they suggest that different forms of 
disclosure for the same underlying information would lead to different effects on 
market prices and misevaluation. In a similar vein, Dellavigna and Pollet (2009) reveal 
that investors underreact to the earnings announcements made on Fridays since their 
attention is distracted by weekends. Hirshleifer. Lim. and Teoh (2009)' based on the 
investor distraction hypothesis, provide evidence that investors underreact to earnings 
announcements when there are multiple announcements by different firms on the same 
day.
The other stream of research examines the busyness effect on professional agencies’
performance. Those studies reveal that professional agencies are not of uniform quality
in busy situations. Beasley H996) and Fich and Shivdasani 120061 reveal that directors’
monitoring efficiency would be impeded if  they are busy with seats on multiple boards.
In a similar vein, Tanyi and Smith (2015) study the association between financial
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reporting quality and audit committee chairperson’s busyness, which is proxied by the 
number o f audit committee chair / financial expertise positions held by a chairperson. 
Their result suggests that companies with a chairperson who held multiple positions 
(busy chairperson) have significantly larger abnormal accruals and a higher likelihood 
o f engaging in target beating behavior. Based on the above evidence, it is reasonable 
to conjecture that, when auditors are busy with the engagements with disaster-affected 
clients, their assurance efficiency for the remaining clients would be lower.
2.3. Prior literature on auditor busyness and audit quality
Current literature related to the association between auditor busyness and audit 
outcome is not conclusive. On the one hand, Goodwin and Wu (2016) expect there is 
no association between the auditor busyness, proxied by the number o f clients, and 
audit quality, as auditors are free to choose the scale o f their client portfolio. Their 
result suggests that the number of clients and audit quality are not significantly 
associated, which they interpret as the case under the equilibrium condition.
On the other hand, a number of studies follow the busyness hypothesis (Beasley 1996: 
Fich and Shivdasani 2006) and reveal an adverse effect of auditor busyness and audit 
outcome. Those studies focus on different contexts. One stream of this literature 
reveals the effect on individual auditor level. Sundgren and Svanstrom (2014) reveal 
a negative association between busy auditor-in-charge who held multiple audit 
assignments with private companies and the likelihood of a going-concern opinion, 
which is a proxy of audit quality. In line with Sundgren and Svanstrom’s study, Gul et 
al. (7017), using data of Chinese publicly listed companies, provide evidence o f a 
negative association between audit partners with more publicly listed clients (busy
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partner) and audit quality, as the attention and effort devoted in each engagement are 
limited. The other stream is on audit office level, Lopez and Peters 120121 document 
that December year-end (busy season) companies which audited by audit offices with 
a higher concentration o f clients’ year-end time are associated with a lower audit 
quality, as their auditors perform a less rigorous audit to fulfill the filing deadlines for 
multiple annual reports simultaneously. Also, Bills et al. (20161 find that audit offices 
with rapid growth impair audit quality temporarily, as rapid growth leads to a high 
workload and intense pressure on the office resources during the growth stage. These 
studies are consistent with the notion o f the detrimental effect of the busy situation 
based on the limited attention argument.
2.4. Hypothesis development
The discussion above leads to a hypothesis that audit outcome o f engagements with 
non-affected clients would be influenced by the busyness of its audit office. Busy 
auditors are required to perform additional audit works to assure that the items related 
to the impact of natural disasters are properly recorded and presented. The extra audit 
procedures arising from natural disasters act as exogenous shocks that intensify the 
pressure on resources allocation within an audit office and accelerate the auditor 
busyness to non-affected clients o f a busy audit office. Although busy offices have to 
devote extra audit efforts to audit engagements for affected clients, it is not likely that 
the busy offices will lax the temporary constraint by employing extra resources (at 
audit office level) for three reasons. First, the need for additional resources is not 
foreseeable. Therefore, it is not feasible for the audit office to plan ahead and adjust 
its resources and workforce. Second, even if the audit office could manage to recruit
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additional auditors on short notice, the cost o f recruiting temporary workforce is much 
higher than the benefits o f obtaining extra manpower. Since audit firms have a unique 
approach for audit testing, those newly admitted non-experienced auditors require 
months o f training and close monitoring. Third, recruiting temporary workforce is 
costly to the audit office. Anderson. Banker, and Janakiraman (2003) suggest costs are 
sticky, in which the slope of cost when the activities increase is larger than the slope 
o f cost when the activities decrease. When the peak season is over, it is not easy for 
the audit office to lay off all the needless audit resources and, as a result, incurs 
additional costs to the audit office. Therefore, audit offices may not consider 
employing extra resources as a practical solution to lower the temporary pressure on 
resources allocation. Consistent with the finding from Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) that 
limited attention would affect the resource allocation, it is not surprising that busy 
offices would merely rearrange their current workforce and assign more resources to 
those clients affected by disasters and pay less attention and effort to their non-affected 
clients which result in either lower audit quality or longer audit time, or both. 
Caramanis and Lennox (20081 suggest that auditors’ ability to detect clients’ potential 
issues and misbehaviors is one o f the major factors that determine the audit quality. 
And they also suggest that low audit effort would reduce the likelihood o f detecting 
companies’ earnings management behavior, which implies a lower audit quality. 
Therefore, I hypothesize that the audit outcome of engagement with non-affected client 
is influenced by the busyness o f its audit office. In particular, my hypotheses are:
HI: Audit quality o f engagement with non-affected client o f a busy office is lower than 
those o f a non-busy office.
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H2: Timely filing o f engagement with non~affected client o f a busy office is lower than 
those o f a non-busy office.
In addition to audit quality and filing timeliness, audit fee is also an important element 
o f audit outcome. Following Kim. Liu, and Zheng (2012), audit fee is a function of 
legal litigation and reputation cost and auditor effort cost. Thus, audit fee is jointly 
determined by the audit effort, which increases the audit quality and lowers the ex­
post audit risk, and the residual audit risk, which is the risk that cannot be mitigated 
by audit effort. Their study suggests a plausible counter-argument on the result of audit 
fees in the busy situation o f an audit office. On the one hand, I expect busy audit offices 
will pay less attention and audit effort to the non-affected clients due to limited 
attention, resulting in a negative association with the audit fees. On the other hand, 
when busy audit offices pay less attention to non-affected clients than affected clients, 
it is expected that the likelihood o f misstatement remains high. And thus, I expect the 
ex-post audit risk for non-affected clients would increase, resulting in a positive 
association with the audit fees. Based on the above argument, I hypothesize that:
H3: Audit fees o f engagement with non-affected client o f a busy office is not different 
from those o f a non-busy office.
Lopez and Peters 12012) reveal that the concentration of busy season companies in an 
auditor’s client portfolio would increase the degree of workload compression and 
impact the audit quality. One can, therefore, expect that the effect o f auditor busyness 
on audit outcome will be stronger if  the affected clients in an auditor’s client portfolio
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are more concentrated. Thus, I exploit several cross-sectional analyses to examine 
whether the effect of auditor busyness suggested by H1-H3 is stronger when the audit 
office is associated with a concentration of busyness.
To the audit outcome of engagements with affected clients o f a busy office, I do not 
have a clear prediction. On the one hand, audit offices assign more resources to the 
engagements with affected clients to maintain the audit quality o f the engagements 
with affected clients. On the other hand, the additional works on assuring the items 
related to the impact o f natural disasters would increase the complexity o f the 
assurance, thus increasing the difficulty o f these engagements. Therefore, the audit 
outcome o f affected clients audited by a busy audit office remains an empirical 
question, which I will examine in the additional analysis.
3. RESEARCH DESIGN
3.1. Research method
I use the following regression to examine the causal relationship between auditor 
busyness and audit outcome:
[AuditOutcome]i,t = ao + aiBusyAuditori,t+ a.2 logAT;,t + a3BTMi,t + oulagLOSSi,t + asLOSS  ̂
+ asFOREIGNu + a7LEVERAGEijt + aslagROA t̂ + a9ROAj,t + aioRZscorei,t + 
anLocalAuditi,t + ctnAOTenure t̂ + ai3client_importancei,t + ai4clientele_sizei)t + 
ai5industry_specialityi,t + ai6Big4i>t + anYearj + ai8SIC2k + Sii(,
where Affected_client=0 & Affected_office=0 (1)
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A SEC registrant is defined as an affected client in year t i f  the headquarter o f that 
company is domiciled in a region affected by at least one natural disaster. 
Affected_client is a binary variable. A value o f 1 indicates the SEC registrant is an 
affected client in year t, and 0 otherwise. My study limits to non-affected clients, i.e. 
Affected_client=0, in order to examine how audit outcome o f engagements with non- 
affected clients is influenced by busy auditors’ limited attention (i.e., the effect of 
auditor busyness), comparing to the audit outcome o f engagements audited by non­
busy auditors8. Further, the study limits to clients audited by non-affected audit office, 
which is the audit office domiciled out of the affected states listed in the Appendix III 
in disaster years (i.e. Affected o f f ic e - 0), to reduce the concern that the effect o f auditor 
busyness on audit outcome is caused by the mishap happened to the audit office itself.
The independent variable o f interest, BusyAuditor is a binary variable. A value of 1 
indicates the audit office has at least one audit engagement with affected client in year 
t, and 0 otherwise. It is expected that BusyAuditor would have a negative effect on 
audit outcome. This is because busy auditors will focus on the audit engagements with 
affected clients, they pay less attention and allocate fewer audit resources to audit 
engagements with non-affected clients. Hence, busy auditor’s ability to detect non- 
affected clients’ potential issues is impeded, resulting in a lower audit quality of 
engagements with its non-affected clients than the audit quality o f engagements 
audited by non-busy auditors.
3.1.1 Audit outcome proxies
8 Refer to Appendix I for detailed explanation.
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The dependent variable of interest [AuditOutcome] is measured in three ways. The 
first outcome is related to audit quality. RESTATE_GAAP is the proxy used to measure 
the audit quality. It is a binary variable. A value o f 1 indicates the financial statement 
has been subsequently restated due to GAAP application failure, and 0 otherwise 
(Francis. Michas. and Yu 2013V The second outcome is related to filing timeliness. 
InNONtimely is the logarithm transformation of one plus the time period delayed 
between the required filing date and final submission date, in which the required filing 
date had been adjusted to the client’s category of SEC filer9. The larger the value of 
InNONtimely, the lower the filing timeliness. The third outcome is audit cost. InFee is 
the logarithm transformation of audit fees. I expect, to the engagements with non- 
affected clients, auditor busyness will result in lower audit quality and lower filing 
timeliness, but no effect on the audit fees as hypothesized previously in HI to H3.
3.1.2 Control variables
I controlled the client characteristics that prior literature has proved as a factor 
influencing audit outcome. logAT is the logged total assets. BTM  is calculated by the 
book value o f equity divided by the market value of equity. LOSS has a value o f 1 if 
the earnings before extraordinary items is negative, and 0 otherwise. lagLOSS has a 
value of 1 if  the earnings before extraordinary items is negative in the previous year, 
and 0 otherwise. FOREIGN has a value o f 1 if  the foreign currency translation is not 
equal to zero, and 0 otherwise. LEVERAGE is calculated by the total liabilities divided
9 The required filling day for non-accelerated filers (with public float less than US$75 million) / 
accelerated filers (with public float between US$75 million and US$700 million)/ large accelerated 
filers (with public float more than US$700 million) is 90 days/ 75 days/ 60 days after fiscal year-end 
respectively.
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by total assets. ROA is the earnings before extraordinary items divided by the average 
total assets. lagROA is the ROA in the previous year. RZscore is the decile rank of 
Altman's (1968) Z-score.
I also supplement the following audit office characteristics to further control the pre­
determined factors that may influence the audit outcome. LocalAudit has a value o f 1 
if  the audit office and its client are located in the same state, and 0 otherwise. 
AOTenure is the number o f years that the audit office has served as the major auditor 
for that client, client Jmportance is the audit fees o f that client divided by the total 
audit fees at the audit office level, clientele_size is the number o f audit client. 
industry specialist has a value o f 1 if  the audit firm has the highest market ratio and 
has more than 10% of the market ratio than its competitor (Minutti-Meza 20131 The 
market ratio is the total audit fees from an industry divided by the national total audit 
fees from that industry. Big4 has a value o f 1 if  the audit office is one o f the Big 4 audit 
firms, and 0 otherwise. Year fixed effect and industry fixed effect are included. 
Appendix II provides the definition of variables.
In order to support my hypotheses, I expect BusyAuditor is positively associated with 
restatement and non-timely filing (ai>0).
3.2. Sample selection and data sources
The initial sample begins with the company-year observations between 2000 and 2013
available on the Compustat database. The sample period begins in 2000 because this
is the first year that the audit office data is available and ends in 2013 because the
disaster data used in this study is available from public source (Hsu et al., 2018 and
Barrot and Sauvagnat, 2016) until 2013. The initial sample contains 106,312 U.S.
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company-year observations. Panel A of Table 1 presents the steps o f sample selection. 
First, I match the headquarter location o f each company with the location o f affected 
regions o f each disaster to identify an affected client. The location o f affected regions 
o f each disaster is defined following Hsu. Lee. Peng, and Yi (2018) and Barrot and 
Sauvagnat (2016)’s studies10. There are 21 catastrophic disasters in the U.S. between 
2000 and 201311. Second, since the company headquarter location available on the 
Compustat database only reflects the current location o f a company headquarter, I also 
complement the company headquarter location by the historical headquarter location 
data, to capture the possibility o f headquarter relocation. The historical headquarter 
location data is obtained from the 10-K filing data provided by Bill McDonald12. Third, 
I match clients with the audit office information available on the Audit Analytics 
database. The observations audited by an audit office with only one client would be 
excluded since the effect of auditor busyness at the audit office would be driven by 
that client entirely. Finally, I eliminate company-year observations located outside the 
50 U.S. states, with non-December fiscal year-end date, with missing financial data, 
in financial or utility industry, and with zero audit fee. The full sample consists 28,169 
company-year observations.
As mentioned in the Section 3.1., I focus on the observations of non-affected clients 
audited by non-affected audit offices in the baseline model to examine how audit 
outcome of engagement with non-affected clients is influenced by busy auditors’ 
limited attention. Panel B o f Table 1 is the distribution o f test sample. The final sample
10 Hsu et al. (2017) and Barrot and Sauvagnat (2016) define natural disaster as catastrophe which lasts 
for less than 30 days and with a total estimated damage more than US$1 billion 2013 constant dollars.
11 Please refer to Appendix III for the list of catastrophic disasters (Panel A) and the map of 
distribution of those disasters (Panel B).
12 10-K Headers with Latitude and Longitude, available online: www3.nd.edu/~mcdonald/10- 
K Headers/10-K Headers.html
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for tiie baseline model consists 22,533 company-year observations, in which 19,742 
observations are non-affected clients audited by non-busy non-affected audit offices 
(i.e., the control group for the baseline model) and 2,791 observations are non-affected 
clients audited by busy non-affected audit offices (i.e., the test group for the baseline 
model)13. Further to the baseline model, I examine the audit outcome o f engagements 
with affected clients in the additional analysis. The initial test sample for the additional 
analysis contains 5,214 company-year observations14. Note that, in the additional 
analysis, I include the observations o f affected clients audited by both affected and 
non-affected audit offices to avoid a significant reduction in the test sample. Since 
most o f the observations (83%) in the full sample are audited by local audit office, a 
large number of observations o f affected clients will be removed if  I limit to the 
observations o f affected clients audited by non-affected audit offices in this additional 
analysis. In the test period, no disaster happened in the fiscal year 2000, 2002, 2006, 
2007, 2009 and 2010.
[Insert Table 1 here]
[Insert Table2 here]
3.3 Descriptive Statistics
Panel A of Table 3 is the descriptive statistics of the full sample. 29.8% of observations 
in the full sample are audited by busy auditor offices, 18.5% of observations are 
affected clients and 18.9% of observations are audited by affected audit offices. Panel 
B of Table 3 is descriptive statistics of the final sample for the baseline model. It
13 As shown in Table 2.
14 Sample selection procedures for the additional analysis will be discussed in the Section 5.2.
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contains 22,533 observations with non-affected clients who are audited by non- 
affected audit offices. In Part A, the variable o f interest BusyAuditor is 0.124, which 
suggests that approximately 12.4% of the observations are audited by a busy audit 
office. Part B is the descriptive statistics of the audit outcome variables. Approximately 
13.3% of the observations are associated with subsequent restatements, which are 
announced from 2000-2017 and on average announced 816 days after the file date of 
the misstated financial statements. The average InNONtimely is 0.311 (equivalent to 
approximately 4.16 days delay in filing) and average InFee is 13.120. Part C is the 
descriptive statistics of the control variables. All continuous variables are winsorized 
at the 1% and 99% level. In addition, Panel B1 of Table 3 separates the final sample 
into treatment and control samples and reports the comparisons between those samples. 
It shows that audit outcomes of the observations audited by busy non-affected audit 
offices are different from those o f the observations audited by non-busy non-affected 
audit offices, in which observations audited by busy non-affected audit offices are with 
a higher likelihood of restatement, lower timely filing and higher audit fees.
[Insert Table3 here]
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
4.1 Baseline model
I estimate the regression for restatement using the logit model and the regression for 
non-timely filing and audit fees using the OLS model. The standard errors are clustered 
at both company and audit office level. Table 4 is the results o f the baseline model. 
Column 1 is the regression for restatement. The coefficient on BusyAuditor is positive
with 10% level of statistical significance. Column 2 is the regression for non-timely
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filing. The coefficient on BusyAuditor is positive with 1% level o f statistical 
significance. In addition, column 3 is the regression for audit fees. I find no statistical 
evidence to support that BusyAuditor is associated with either a higher or a lower audit 
fee for its non-affected clients15. For the control variable, I find that my audit outcome 
proxies are positively associated with client complexity (.FOREIGN and LEVERAGE) 
and client-specific risks (LOSS and the inverse of ROA, and the inverse o f lagROA). 
The regression results in Table 4 suggest that audit quality and filing timeliness of 
engagements with non-affected clients o f a busy office are lower than those of a non­
busy office.
[Insert Table4 here]
4.2. Cross-sectional effect of the concentration of busyness
To reveal the association between concentration of busyness and audit outcome, I 
separate BusyAuditor in Eq.(l) into two interaction terms to proxy for a BusyAuditor 
with a high or low concentration of busyness in different situations. In these cross- 
sectional analyses, a significant coefficient o f the interaction term indicates an effect 
o f auditor busyness on audit outcome, compared to the observations audited by non­
busy audit offices. Also, I expected the coefficient of BusyAuditor with a high 
concentration o f busyness to be stronger in magnitude and significantly different from 
the coefficient of BusyAuditor with a low concentration o f busyness. To capture the 
difference between these two groups, I add a F-test at the end o f each cross-sectional 
analyses and reported in the last row o f each table (Table 5-10).
15 The cross-section analyses in the additional session will contribute to a better understanding on the 
effect of auditor busyness on audit fees.
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First, I study the auditor busyness related to the time of clients affected by natural 
disasters. In the full sample, 24.81% of the clients audited by a busy office with clients 
affected by disasters occurred in the last quarter o f the year (i.e., from October to 
December). Since the additional audit works on the reported items related to the last 
quarter natural disaster are not foreseeable during the initial audit planning, a busy 
office would face a stronger pressure on its resources and workforce if  its clients are 
affected by the natural disasters close to the fiscal year end date. Thus, I expect the 
busyness effect on audit outcome o f engagements with non-affected clients will be 
stronger if  the busy office has engagements with clients affected by the last quarter 
disaster. I add a dummy variable, Q4disaster (honQ4disaster) to indicate a client o f a 
busy audit office which audited at least one (no) engagement with an affected client 
who is affected by at least one natural disaster that occurred in the last quarter. I then 
re-estimate Eq(l) with the Q4disasterXBusyAuditdr and nonQ4disasterXBusyAuditor 
to reveal the association between concentration o f busyness and audit outcome. The 
regression results are presented in Table 5. The coefficient on 
Q4disasterXBusyAuditor is positive with 1% level o f statistical significance in the 
regression for restatement, but the coefficient on nonQ4disasterXBusyAuditor is 
insignificant. The difference between the coefficient on Q4disasterXBusyAuditor and 
nonQ4disasterXBusyAuditor is with 5% level o f statistical significance. The result 
suggests that the insufficient time on audit planning, induced by clients affected by last 
quarter disasters, influences the resources allocation in a busy office and results in a 
lower audit quality o f engagements with its non-affected clients.
[Insert Table5 here]
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Second, I study the auditor busyness related to the ratio o f clients affected by disasters. 
In the full sample, the average of percentage o f affected clients in an audit office client 
portfolio (i.e., the number o f affected clients divided by the number o f total clients in 
year t) is 18.50%. I expect the busyness effect on audit outcome o f engagements with 
non-affected clients would be stronger if the audit office has a high concentration of 
affected clients. To test the inference, I use an indicator variable, Heavy (Slight), to 
indicate a client o f a busy audit office with the percentage o f affected clients above 
(below) the sample median in the busy sample. I then re-estimate Eq(l) with the 
HeavyXBusyAuditor and SlightXBusyAuditor to reveal the association between 
concentration o f busyness and audit outcome. Table 6 presents the regression results. 
The coefficient on HeavyXBusyAuditor is negative with 1% level of statistical 
significance in the regression for audit fees and is positive with 5% level o f statistical 
significance in the regression for restatement. The result suggests that the lower audit 
quality o f engagements with non-affected clients of a heavily busy office is a result o f 
a lower audit effort to those clients since it is more difficult for a heavily busy office 
to relocate its resources. On the other hand, the coefficient on SlightXBusyAuditor is 
positive with 1% level o f statistical significance in the regression for audit fees and is 
not statistically significant in the regression for restatement. The difference between 
the coefficient on HeavyXBusyAuditor and SlightXBusyAuditor are with 1 % level of 
statistical significance in the regression for audit fees, but statistical insignificance in 
the regression for restatement. In the regression for non-timely filing, only the 
coefficient on SlightXBusyAuditor is positive and statistically significance, which is 
not consistent with my conjecture. The inconsistent result may due to busy audit 
offices with a low concentration o f affected clients face a less tight resource constraint. 
And thus, it is easier for them to rearrange the audit resource to maintain the audit
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quality, indicated by an insignificance coefficient on SlightXBusyAuditor in the 
regression for restatement, but it requires more audit effort, indicated by a positive and 
statistically significant coefficient on SlightXBusyAuditor in the regression for audit 
fee, and filing time to maintain the audit quality. The result suggests that audit 
engagements with affected clients influence auditor’s attention to non-affected clients 
and increase the ex-post audit risks, but slightly busy offices are able to relocate their 
resources and maintain the audit quality.
[Insert Table6 here]
Third, I study the auditor busyness related to the audit office’s industrial specialty in
the client’s industry. In the full sample, 93.43% of the clients audited by a busy office
who is a non-industrial specialist. Industrial specialist audit office is believed to
provide better audit quality to engagements with its clients who are in the industry that
the office is specialized in, as that office is more knowledgeable in the industry-wide
operation practices and has more experience in auditing clients in that industry. It is
expected that the audit office’s industrial specialty would mitigate part of the busyness
effect on audit outcome of engagements with non-affected clients and maintain the
audit quality o f engagements with non-affected clients who are in the industry that the
office is specialized in. On the contrary, I expect the busyness effect on audit outcome
of engagements with non-affected clients would be stronger if  the audit engagements
are audited by a non-industrial specialist busy audit office. Thus, the audit
engagements with non-affected clients who are audited by a non-specialist busy audit
office would be in lower audit quality. To test the inference, I add an indicator variable,
Specialist (nonSpecialist), to indicate an audit engagement audited by an industrial
specialist (a non-industrial specialist) audit office. An audit office is an industrial
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specialist if  the office (at MSA level) has the highest aggregated annual audit fees in 
an industry. I then re-estimate Eq(l) with the SpecialistXBusyAuditor and 
nonSpecialistXBusyAuditor to reveal the association between concentration of 
busyness and audit outcome. Table 7 presents the regression results. The coefficient 
on nonSpecialistXBusyAuditor is negative with 5% level o f statistical significance in 
the regression for audit fees and is positive with 5% level o f statistical significance in 
the regression for restatement. The result suggests that the lower audit quality of 
engagements with non-affected clients o f a non-industrial specialist audit office is a 
result o f a lower audit effort to those clients. Since the non-industrial specialist audit 
office is less knowledgeable in the client’s industry-wide operation practices and is 
less experienced in auditing clients in that industry, less audit effort to its clients 
significantly deteriorates the audit quality of engagements with its non-affected clients. 
On the contrary, the coefficient on SpecialistXBusyAuditor is positive with 1% level 
o f statistical significance in the regression for audit fees and is statistically insignificant 
in the regression for restatement. The difference between the coefficient on 
SpecialistXBusyAuditor and nonSpecialistXBusyAuditor are with 1% level of 
statistical significance in the regression for audit fees and with 10% level o f statistical 
significance in the regression for restatement. The result suggests that audit 
engagements with affected clients influence auditor’s attention to non-affected clients 
and increase the ex-post audit risks, but the industrial specialist busy audit office, 
which is more knowledgeable in the client’s industry-wide operation practices and is 
more experienced in auditing clients in that industry, is able to maintain the audit 
quality of engagements with non-affected clients.
[Insert Table7 here]
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Fourth, I study the auditor busyness related to resource constraints. In the full sample, 
29.10% of the observations audited by busy audit offices are clients of non-Big 4 audit 
offices. I expect the busyness effect on audit outcome of engagements with non- 
affected clients would be stronger if  the busy audit office is a non-Big 4 audit office, 
as small audit office is believed to have fewer resources and tighter resource 
constraints. To test the inference, I use an indicator variable, nonBig4 (Big4), to 
indicate a client o f a non-Big 4 (Big 4) audit office. I then re-estimate Eq(l) with the 
nonBig4XBusyAuditor and Big4XBusyAuditor to reveal the association between 
concentration of busyness and audit outcome. The regression results are presented in 
Table 8. The coefficient on nonBig4XBusyAuditor is negative with 1% level of 
statistical significance in the regression for audit fees and is positive with 5% level of 
statistical significance in the regression for restatement. The result suggests that the 
lower audit quality of engagements with non-affected clients of a non-Big 4 busy 
office is a result o f a lower audit effort to those clients, since a non-Big 4 office has a 
tighter resource constraint and thus is not able to pay attention to both affected and 
non-affected clients when some o f its clients are affected by natural disasters. In 
contrast, the coefficient on Big4XBusyAuditor is positive with 1% level o f statistical 
significance in the regression for audit fees and is insignificant in the regression for 
restatement. The result suggests that audit engagements with affected clients influence 
auditor’s attention to non-affected clients and increase the ex-post audit risks, but the 
Big 4 busy office, which has support from its office network, gets a better chance to 
relocate its resources and maintain the audit quality. The difference between the 
coefficient on nonBig4XBusyAuditor and Big4XBusyAuditor is with 1% level of
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statistical significance in the regression for audit fees but is marginally insignificant in 
the regression for restatement (F=2.11; p=0.15).
[Insert Tcible8 here]
Fifth, I study the auditor busyness related to the office’s familiarity with its client’s 
business operation. In the full sample, 17.06% of the observations audited by a busy 
office are a new client to its audit office (i.e., year t is the first engagement year). I 
expect the busyness effect on audit outcome o f engagements with non-affected clients 
would be intensified if  the non-affected client is a new client to the busy office because 
the busy office has no prior experience in auditing that client and is not familiar with 
the client’s business operation in the first engagement year. I create a dummy variable, 
FirstEngagement (nonFirstEngagement) which has a value o f 1 if  year t is (is not) the 
first year of the client-audit office tenure16. I then re-estimate Eq(l) with the 
FirstEngagementXBusyAuditor and nonFirstEngagementXBusyAuditor to reveal the 
association between concentration o f busyness and audit outcome. Table 9 presents 
the regression results. The coefficient on Fir stEngagementXBusy Auditor and 
nonFirstEngagementXBusyAuditor are both positive and statistically significant in the 
regression for non-timely filing, with 1% and 5% level o f statistical significance 
respectively. In particular, the busyness effect on non-timely filing is stronger when 
the non-affected client is a new client to a busy audit office. The coefficient on 
Fir stEngagementXBusy Auditor is larger in magnitude and higher in statistically 
significance (p2=0.218; z=3.337) than the coefficient on
nonFirstEngagementXBusyAuditor (p 1=0.056; z=2.356). The result suggests that
16 Observations in year 2000 are excluded in this test, as year 2000 is the first year of the client-audit 
office tenure in the test period. Thus, an experienced audit office cannot be identified.
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audit engagements with affected clients influence auditor’s attention to non-affected 
clients. However, the regression result for audit quality does not support my inference. 
The coefficient on FirstEngagementXBusyAuditor is positive with 10% level of 
statistical significance in the regression for restatement but the difference between the 
coefficient on FirstEngagementXBusyAuditor and nonFirstEngagementXBusyAuditor 
is not statistically significant (F=0.94; p=0.33). A possible reason for the insignificant 
difference is that a busy audit office is not associated with a lower audit effort to its 
new clients, as shown by the negative but statistically insignificant coefficient on 
FirstEngagementXBusyAuditor in the regression for audit fees, and thus not associated 
with a lower audit quality of engagements with those clients.
[Insert Table9 here]
Lastly, I study the auditor busyness related to the severity of damage in the client’s 
location. An affected state will be declared as a major disaster state if  the damage 
caused by natural disasters is so severe that the local government is not able to handle 
the recovery process by its own capability and require the Federal assistance. I expect 
the effect o f auditor busyness on audit outcome would be stronger if  the busy office 
has affected clients from major disaster states since those engagements are associated 
with an even higher audit risk than the average disaster-affected clients.
I create a dummy variable, MajorDisasterXBusyAuditor
(nonMajorDisasterXBusyAuditor) which has a value o f 1 if the busy office has at least 
one client (has no client) from major disaster states. I then re-estimate Eq(l) with the 
MajorDisasterXBusy Auditor and nonMajorDisasterXBusyAuditor to reveal the 
association between concentration o f busyness and audit outcome.
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Table 10 presents the regression results. The coefficient on 
MajorDisasterXBusyAuditor is positive and statistically significant in the regression 
for restatement, with 1% level of statistical significance. The difference between the 
coefficient on MajorDisasterXBusyAuditor and nonMajorDisasterXBusyAuditor is 
with 5% level of statistical significance in the regression for restatement. The result 
suggests that audit engagements with affected clients located in major disaster states 
distracted auditor’s attention from those with non-affected clients, resulting in a lower 
quality of audit for audit engagements with non-affected clients. However, the 
regression results of timely filing and audit fees do not support my inference. The F- 
statistic o f both tests is not statistical significance.
[Insert TablelO here]
In sum, the results of the cross-sectional analyses largely consistent with my 
hypotheses and further support my causal inference. As the coefficient o f BusyAuditor 
with a high concentration o f busyness captures the effect o f auditor busyness during a 
relatively high level of resource constraint, the results suggest that high concentration 
o f auditor busyness influences auditor’s attention to its non-affected clients and 
associates with a stronger effect on the audit outcome of engagements with non- 
affected clients.
5. ROBUSTNESS TESTS AND ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS
5.1.1 Robustness test on adding audit firm fixed effect
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To reduce the likelihood of spurious correlation and leave auditor busyness as the only 
channel that influences the audit outcome, I include the audit firm fixed effect for 
controlling the audit firm’s characteristics. Table 11 presents the regression results. 
The coefficient on BusyAuditor is positive but marginally insignificant in the 
regression for restatement. And the coefficient on BusyAuditor is positive with 5% 
level of statistical significance in the regression for non-timely filing and positive with 
1% level of statistical significance in the regression for audit fees. For the control 
variables, the coefficients are similar to those in the baseline model. The results are 
largely consistent with those in the baseline model, which further support my 
hypotheses that the audit outcome o f the engagements with non-affected clients is 
influenced by the busyness of the audit office.
[Insert Table 11 here]
5.1.2 Robustness test on using alternative measures o f audit quality 
I confirm the robustness of the results using four alternative measures o f audit quality. 
The first and second proxies are different definitions o f discretionary accrual, which 
are abs_DAM, the absolute value o f modified-Jones model discretionary accrual, and 
abs_DAM_adj us ted, the absolute value o f the industry mean modified-Jones model 
discretionary accrual. The absolute value o f discretionary accrual reflects the quality 
o f accounting information. A high absolute value of discretionary accruals implies a 
low quality o f audit. The third proxy is the likelihood of going concern issuance to the 
financially distressed clients. GCjssuance is a dummy variable, which has a value of 
1 if the auditor issued a going concern opinion to a financially distressed company. A 
company is categorized as financially distressed if it has negative cash flow from
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operation, negative retained earnings, negative net income and negative current ratio 
in year t. The likelihood o f going concern issuance to financially distressed companies 
reflects auditors’ ability to detect and willingness to report the underlying issues o f the 
client’s financial condition, which indicates that the lower the GCJssuance, the lower 
the audit quality. The last proxy is the likelihood of error in going concern issuance. 
An error in going concern issuance indicates that the audit opinion does not reflect the 
underlying performance o f the company and cannot inform the financial statement 
users on the company’s potential failure, and thus a lower quality o f audit. I use two 
measures in this test. In particular, Type! error is a dummy variable, which has a value 
o f 1 if  the auditor issued a going concern opinion to its non-financially distressed client. 
A Type I error indicates the auditor is conservative in going concern issuance, which 
reflects the auditor is in a lower competence in the assurance. Type2error is a dummy 
variable, which has a value o f 1 if the auditor issued a clean opinion to its financially 
distressed client. Since going concern opinion is costly to the client, a Type II error 
indicates the auditor’s high incentive in going concern issuance, which reflects the 
auditor is independent in the assurance. The higher the Type 1 error or Type2error, the 
lower the audit quality.
Table 12 presents the regression results. The coefficients on BusyAuditor are both
positive with 5% and 1 % level o f statistical significance in the regression for abs_DAM
and absJDAM_adjusted respectively. However, the coefficient on BusyAuditor is
insignificant in the regression for GCJssuance. A possible reason for the insignificant
result in the regression for GCJssuance is that a busy office may not lax the
professional judgment in issuing the going concern opinion to its financially distressed
non-affected clients simply due to the distraction caused by the audit engagements
with its affected clients. Bankruptcy is a serious operation failure for a company and
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generally does not happen overnight. It is expected that a diligence audit office would 
be able to identity the potential risk and provide the financial statement users with an 
early warning. An audit office who inappropriately issue a clean opinion to a bankrupt 
company would face a serious damage in its reputation and a costly litigation risk, so 
the busy audit office may not reduce its effort in assessing the going concern o f its 
non-affected clients. Lastly, for the regression of errors in going concern issuance, the 
coefficient on BusyAuditor is positive with a 10% level o f statistical significance in 
the Type I error test (using a smaple o f non-financially distressed client), but not 
statistical significance in the Type II error test (using a smaple o f financially distressed 
client). The result o f Type I error test suggests the audit engagements audited by busy 
offices are associated with a higher likelihood of error in going concern issuance to 
their non-financially distressed clients than the engagements audited by non-busy 
offices. As busy audit offices pay less attention to their non-disaster affected clients, 
auditors become more conservative in going concern issuance to minimize their 
liability in the condition of company failure, reflecting a reduction of auditors’ 
competence during the busy situation. The result o f Type II error test mainly captures 
the auditors’ incentive in going concern issuance, which is not affected by the busy 
situation, and thus there is no significant association.
[Insert Tablel2 here]
5.2. Additional analysis o f the audit outcome o f engagements with affected clients
In this section, I explore the audit outcome o f engagements with affected clients of a
busy office. On the one hand, busy audit offices assign more resources to the
engagements with affected clients to maintain the audit quality o f those engagements.
On the other hand, since the reported items related to natural disasters are relatively
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large and mainly based on managers1 estimation, the assurance works for affected 
clients require more professional judgments, and thus require more audit resources to 
collect additional audit evidence and conduct more in-depth audit tests. Giving these 
two opposing views on the effect of audit quality o f engagements with affected clients, 
I do not have a clear prediction on whether a busy office can maintain the audit quality 
of the engagements with affected clients. To provide more evidence on this unexplored 
issue, I supplement Eq.(l) with Affected_client. The initial test sample contains 5,214 
company-year observations o f affected clients. I match each affected client with the 
observation o f the same client at year t-1 to identify the control sample in order to 
examine whether a busy office can maintain the audit quality of engagements with 
affected clients. I then eliminate the observation i) if  the client experienced a change 
in major audit office from year t-1 to year t and ii) if  the client was affected by disasters 
in both year t-1 and year t. The final sample for this additional analysis contains 6,326 
observations with 3,163 pairs o f observations from the same client in the affected year 
and non-affected year. I expect a positive and statistically significant coefficient on 
Affected_client if  the busy office is not able to maintain the audit quality o f 
engagements with its affected clients, otherwise, an insignificant coefficient on 
Affected_client if  the busy office is able to maintain the audit quality of engagements 
with its affected clients. The regression results are presented in Table 13. The 
coefficients on Affected_client are insignificant in the regression for audit outcome 
measured by restatement and non-timely filing but is positive with 1% level o f 
statistical significance in the regression for audit fees. Thus, the result suggests that 
busy offices are able to maintain the audit quality o f engagements with affected clients. 
Also, busy audit offices charge a higher price on the engagements with affected clients,
31
since those offices have to pay more attention and audit effort to the engagements with 
the affected clients to maintain the audit quality.
[Insert Table 13 here]
6. CONCLUSIONS
The questions on whether and how auditor busyness influences audit outcome had 
recently attracted researchers’ attention and are not yet settled. While previous studies 
examine the issue using the auditors’ clientele size as a proxy for auditor busyness, the 
result of these studies may be biased due to the endogeneity arising from the selection 
o f clients by auditors as well as the selection o f auditors by clients. This study takes 
the advantage of the exogenous shock induced by the natural disasters to examine the 
causal relationship between auditor busyness and audit outcome. Following the limited 
attention hypothesis, in the baseline model of this study, I find that audit offices are 
distracted by the additional audit works for the reported items related to natural 
disasters o f an affected client and paid less attention to their non-affected clients, 
resulting in a negative effect on the audit outcome of engagements with their non- 
affected clients. Moreover, I find that the busyness effect on audit outcome is stronger 
when the busy situation is concentrated with resources and time constraints. In sum, 
this study contributes to a better understanding of the effect of auditor busyness on 
audit outcome.
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APPENDIX I -  RESEARCH METHOD
Figure 1 Resea rch model — sample sefectiori
Figure 1 presents the sample selection o f this study. Affected (non-affected) clients 
refer to SEC registrants who are suffered (are not suffered) from the impact of natural 
disasters in a year. Busy (Non-busy) audit offices refer to audit offices with at least 
one (without) engagement with affected client in a year.
The circle refers to the observations of this study. The outer circle with dots refers to 
the observations with non-affected clients audited by non-busy audit offices. The inner 
oval refers to the observations audited by busy audit offices. In the inner oval, there 
are two categories of clients audited by busy offices: inner oval with stripes refers to 
non-affected clients, and inner oval without stripes refers to affected clients.
In the baseline model, I limit the observations to non-affected clients in order to 
examine how audit outcome of engagements with non-affected clients is influenced by 
busy auditors' limited attention, comparing to the audit outcome o f engagements 
audited by non-busy auditors. In sum, I compare the audit outcome o f engagements 
with non-affected clients audited by busy offices (i.e., the test group in this study) with 
the audit outcome o f engagements with non-affected clients audited by non-busy 
offices (i.e., the control group in this study).
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APPENDIX II- VARIABLE DEFINITION
Variable Definition
<Audit outcome variable>
RESTATE_GAAP = 1 if  the financial statement has been subsequently restated
InNONtimely
due to GAAP application failure, and 0 otherwise.
= the logarithm transformation o f (1 + the time period 
delayed between the required filing date and final 
submission date), in which the required filing date had been 
adjusted to the client’s category o f SEC filer.
InFee
abs_DAM
= the logarithm transformation of audit fees.
= absolute value o f modified-Jones model discretionary 
accrual.
abs_DAM adjusted = the performance-matched discretionary accrual, which is 
the absolute value of the industry mean modified-Jones 
model discretionary accrual.
GC_issuance = 1 if  a financially distressed company receives a going 
concern opinion. A company is categorized as financially 
distress if  it has negative cash flow from operation, retained 
earnings, net income and current ratio (total current assets 
divided by total current liabilities) in year t.
Typel error = 1 if  the auditor issued a going concern opinion to a non- 
financially distressed company.
Type2 error = 1 if  the auditor issued a clean opinion to a financially 
distressed company.
<Variable ofinterest>
BusyAuditor = 1 if  the audit office has at least one engagement with
Affected_client
affected client in year t, and 0 otherwise.
= 1 if  the SEC registrant is suffered from natural disaster in 
year t, and 0 otherwise.
Affected_office — 1 if  the audit office is suffered from natural disaster in 
year t, and 0 otherwise.
<Control Variables>
logAT
BTM
= the logged total assets in year t.
= the book value o f equity divided by the market value of 
equity at the end o f year t.
LOSS = 1 if  the earnings before extraordinary items is negative in 
year t, and 0 otherwise.
lagLOSS = 1 if  the earnings before extraordinary items is negative in 
the previous year, and 0 otherwise.
FOREIGN = 1 if  the foreign currency translation is not equal to zero, and 
0 otherwise.
LEVERAGE
ROA
= the total liabilities divided by total assets in year t.
-  the earnings before extraordinary items divided by the 
average total assets in year t.
lagROA
RZscore
= ROA in the previous year.
= the decile rank of the Altman’s (1968) Z-score, which is 
1.2 o f Working capital divided by total assets + 1.4 of
34
LocalAudit
AOTenure
client_importance
clientele_size
industry_specialist
Big4
Retained earnings divided by total assets + 3.3 o f Earnings 
before interest and taxes divided by total assets + 0.6 of 
Market value equity divided by total liabilities + 1.0 o f Sales 
divided by total assets.
— 1 if  the audit office and its client are located in the same 
state, and 0 otherwise.
= the number o f years that the audit office has served as the 
major auditor for that client.
=the audit fees o f that client divided by the sum of audit fees 
audited by audit office j in year t.
= the number o f audit client audited by audit office j in year 
t.
=1 if  the audit firm has the highest market ratio and has more 
than 10% of the market ratio than its competitor in year t. The 
market ratio o f audit firm j is measured by the total audit fees 
in industry k audited by the audit firm j divided by the 
national total audit fees in industry k.
= 1 if  the audit office is one o f the Big 4 audit firms, and 0 
otherwise.
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Table 1 Sam ple distribution
Panel A  Sam ple selection
Observations
Observations from Compustat for the period between 2000 and 2013 106,312
Less:
Observations with missing audit office data 7,095
Observations located outside the 50 U.S. states 287
Observations with non-December fiscal year-end date 29,955
Observations audited by an audit office with only one client 4,083
Observations with missing financial data 36,659
Observations in financial or utility industry 27
Observations with zero audit fee ; 37 78,143
Full sample 28,169
Panel B  Distribution o f  test sample
Non-affected client Affected client
Non-affected audit office 22,533* 326 22,859
Affected audit office 422 4,888 5,310
' ________  22,955 r  ̂ 5,214A 28,169
*Final sample for the baseline model
A Initial test sample for the additional analysis on affected clients
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Observation Observation
with busy non-affected audit office with non-busy non-affected audit office ;
Table 2 D istribution o f  busy non-affected audit office by fisc a l ye a r  -  baseline model
Fiscal year Affected client Non-affected client Non-affected client ; Total
2000 0 0 . 1,931 1,931
2001 27 ' . 2 3 2 1,338 1,597
2002 0 0 2,295 2,295
2003 67 598 691 1,356
2004 44 ■ 462 761 1,267
2005 49 ■ 476 1,235 1,760
2006 0 ■ 2,130 2,133
2007 0 0 ■ 2,049 2,049
2008 ; : 33 . : 193 1,229 1,455
2009 ■ o / : 10 ' 1,916 1,926
2010 o ; o 1,833 1,833
2011 43 222 430 695
2012 47 373 635 1,055
2013 16 : 222 1,269 1,507
326 2,791a 19,742b 22,859
a: Test group for the baseline model
b: Control group for the baseline model
a+b: Final sample for the baseline model (22,533 observations)
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Table 3 D escriptive Statistics
Panel A  Full sample (including affected clients)
VARIABLES N Mean Std. Dev. P5 P25 Median P75 P95
<Part A. Variable of interest>
BusyAuditor 28,169 0.298 0.458 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
Affected_client 28,169 0.185 0.388 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
Affected_office 28,169 0.189 0.391 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
<Part B. Audit outcome variables>
RESTATE_GAAP 28,169 0.137 0.344 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
InNONtimely 28,168 0.313 0.934 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 2.708
InFee 28,169 13.14 1.440 10.87 12.08 13.16 14.13 15.53
<Part C. Control Variables>
logAT 28,169 5.364 2.463 1.087 3.768 5.492 7.054 9.229
BTM 28,169 0.288 1.807 -0.758 0.178 0.402 0.727 1.733
lagLOSS 28,169 0.446 0.497 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
LOSS 28,169 0.448 0.497 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
FOREIGN 28,169 0.233 0.423 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
LEVERAGE 28,169 0.327 0.684 0.000 0 .0 1 0 0.180 0.370 0.919
lagROA 28,169 -0 .2 1 0 0.790 -1.137 -0.156 0.014 0.068 0.172
ROA 28,169 -0.217 0.832 -1.174 -0.154 0.014 0.067 0.170
RZscore 28,169 0.550 0.287 0 .1 0 0 0.300 0.500 0.800 1.000
LocalAudit 28,169 0.830 0.376 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
AOTenure 28,169 6.865 4.249 1.000 3.000 6 .0 0 0 11.000 14.000
client_importance 28,169 0.206 0.258 0.009 0.032 0.096 0.272 0.894
clientele_size 28,169 20.29 19.18 2 .0 0 0 6 .0 0 0 13.000 29.000 62.000
industry_specialist 28,169 0.159 0.365 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
Big4 28,169 0.697 0.460 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Panel B  Baseline model
VARIABLES N Mean Std. Dev. P5 P25 Median P75 P95
<Part A. Variable of in terest
BusyAuditor 22,533 0.124 0.329 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0
<Part B. Audit outcome variables>
RESTATEJIAAP 22,533 0.133 0.339 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 1 .000
InNONtimely 22,532 0.311 0.930 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 2.708
InFee 22,533 13.120 1.427 10.870 12.060 13.140 14.090 15.490
<Part C. Control Variables>
logAT 22,533 5.339 2.440 1.109 3.769 5.451 7.009 9.197
BTM 22,533 0.297 1.786 -0.732 0.178 0.402 0.726 1.762
lagLOSS 22,533 0.454 0.498 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 1 .000 1 .0 0 0
LOSS 22,533 0.455 0.498 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0
FOREIGN 22,533 0.230 0.421 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0
LEVERAGE 22,533 0.322 0.672 0 .0 0 0 0.009 0.175 0.370 0.915
lagROA 22,533 -0.208 0.778 -1.118 -0.163 0.013 0.068 0.172
ROA 22,533 -0.216 0.813 -1.153 -0.161 0 .0 1 2 0.067 0.170
RZscore 22,533 0.548 0.287 0 .1 0 0 0.300 0.500 0.800 1 .000
LocalAudit 22,533 0.847 0.360 0 .0 0 0 1 .000 1 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 1 .000
AOTenure 22,533 6.864 4.243 1 .000 3.000 6 .0 0 0 1 1 .0 0 0 14.000
client_importance 22,533 0.204 0.254 0.009 0.033 0.096 0.269 0.867
clientele_size 22,533 2 0 .0 2 0 18.750 2 .0 0 0 6 .0 0 0 13.000 29.000 62.000
industryspecialist 22,533 0.153 0.360 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 1 .000
Big4 22,533 0.697 0.460 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 1 .000 1 .000
42
Table 3 D escriptive Statistics (C on’t)
Panel B1 Non-affected clients in the treatment and, control samples
Observation Observation
with busy non- with non-busy non-
affected audit office affected audit office Diff. in mean b/w
VARIABLES N Mean N Mean the samples
REST ATE_G AAP 2,791 0.167 19,742 0.128 -0.040*** (-5.79)
InNONtimely 2,791 0.397 19,741 0.298 -0.099*** (-5.25)
InFee 2,791 13.220 19,742 13.104 -0.116*** (-4.01)
logAT 2,791 5.464 19,742 5.322 -0 143*** (-2.89)
BTM 2,791 0 .211 19,742 0.309 0.099*** (2.73)
lagLOSS 2,791 0.419 19,742 0.459 0.040*** (4.02)
LOSS 2,791 0.426 19,742 0.459 0.033*** (3.31)
FOREIGN 2,791 0.251 19,742 0.227 -0.025*** (-2.89)
LEVERAGE 2,791 0.349 19,742 0.318 -0.031** (-2.28)
lagROA 2,791 -0.226 19,742 -0.205 0 .0 2 1 (1.32)
ROA 2,791 -0.239 19,742 -0 .2 1 2 0.027 (1.64)
RZscore 2,791 0.548 19,742 0.548 0 .0 0 0 (0.07)
LocalAudit 2,791 0.859 19,742 0.846 -0.013* (-1.84)
AOTenure 2,791 7.283 19,742 6.805 -0.478*** (-5.57)
client_importance 2,791 0.131 19,742 0.214 0.083*** (16.23)
clientelejsize 2,791 28.346 19,742 18.847 _9 4 9 9 *** (-25.41)
industry_specialist 2,791 0.178 19,742 0.149 -0.029*** (-4.00)
Big4 2,791 0.730 19,742 0.692 -0.038*** (-4.08)
Remarks: t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * represent the p-value is smaller than 1%, 
5%, and 10%, respectively.
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Table 4 Baseline m odel
VARIABLES RESTATE GAAP InNONtimely InFee
BusyAuditor 0.129* 0.082*** 0 .0 0 2
(1.833) (3.487) (0.149)
logAT 0.104*** -0.026*** 0.487***
(5.753) (-5.216) (101.375)
BTM 0.003 -0.031*** -0.017***
(0.192) (-4.575) (-5.148)
lagLOSS 0.039 -0.018 0.096***
(0.684) (-1 .11 0) (9.173)
LOSS 0.114* 0.127*** 0.073***
(1.952) (7.369) (6.664)
FOREIGN 0.116* 0.083*** 0.243***
(1.653) (4.859) (14.524)
LEVERAGE 0.003 0.132*** 0.066***
(0.071) (5.418) (5.740)
lagROA -0.105** -0 .0 1 0 0.006
(-2.224) (-0.450) (0.546)
ROA -0.054 -0.114*** -0 .1 1 2***
(-1.2 0 2 ) (-4.553) (-9.469)
RZscore -0.157 -0.065** 0.065**
(-1.332) (-2.009) (2.317)
LocaLAudit -0.183** -0.124*** 0.034*
(-2.394) (-5.320) (1.835)
AOTenure -0.014* -0.016*** -0.003*
(-1.708) (-8.762) (-1.649)
client_importance -0.072 0 .2 1 2 *** 0.393***
(-0.561) (5.994) (11.536)
clientele_size -0 .0 0 1 0 .0 0 1 *** 0.005***
(-0.394) (2.662) (10.776)
industry specialist 0.052 0.061*** 0 .1 0 1 ***
(0.665) (3.404) (5.050)
Big4 -0.026 0 .0 1 2 0.325***
(-0.315) (0.607) (16.542)
Constant -2.485*** 0.513*** 9.032***
(-3.069) (2.862) (45.699)
Observations 22,504 22,532 22,533
PseudoR2/R2 0.032 0.131 0.857
Year FE YES YES YES
Industry FE YES YES YES
Remarks: t-statistics/ z-statistics are reported in parentheses for the regression of restatement/ the
regression of non-timely filing and audit fess. ***, **, * represent the p-value is smaller than 1%, 5%,
and 10%, respectively.
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Table 5 Year-end natural disaster and audit outcome
VARIABLES RESTATE GAAP InNONtimely InFee
nonQ4disasterXBusyAuditor (p i) 0.050 0.088*** 0.008
(0.634) (3.348) (0.549)
Q4disasterXBusyAuditor (|}2) 0.376*** 0.061 -0 .0 2 0
(3.236) (1.441) (-0.932)
logAT 0.105*** -0.026*** 0.487***
(5.806) (-5.226) (101.379)
BTM 0.003 -0.031*** -0.017***
(0.198) (-4.576) (-5.146)
lagLOSS 0.038 -0.018 0.096***
(0.677) (-1.109) (9.175)
LOSS 0 .1 1 2 * 0.127*** 0.073***
(1.914) (7.376) (6.678)
FOREIGN 0.116* 0.083*** 0.243***
(1.647) (4.861) (14.527)
LEVERAGE 0.004 0.132*** 0.066***
(0.088) (5.416) (5.735)
lagROA “0.104** -0 .0 1 0 0.006
(-2.193) (-0.454) (0.537)
ROA -0.054 -0 114*** -0 .1 1 2***
(-1.199) (-4.552) (-9.463)
RZscore -0.161 -0.065** 0.065**
(-1.365) (-2 .0 0 2 ) (2.325)
LocalAudit -0.181** -0.124*** 0.034*
(-2.369) (-5.326) (1.826)
AOTenure -0.014* -0.016*** -0.003
(-1.723) (-8.760) (-1.644)
client_importance -0.072 0 .2 1 2 *** 0.393***
(-0.560) (5.994) (11.534)
clientele size -0 .001 0 .0 0 1 *** 0.005***
(-0.437) (2.673) (10.790)
industry_specialist 0.049 0.061*** 0 .1 0 2***
(0.625) (3.415) (5.062)
Big4 -0.023 0 .0 1 1 0.325***
(-0.289) (0.598) (16.533)
Constant -2.496*** 0.514*** 9.033***
(-3.078) (2.867) (45.712)
Observations 22,504 22,532 22,533
PseudoR2/R2 0.0324 0.131 0.857
F-statistic for testing pi-fS2=0 6.57 0.33 1.35
(p<0.05) (p=0.57) (p=0.25)
Year FE YES YES YES
Industry FE YES YES YES
Remarks: t-statistics/ z-statistics are reported in parentheses for the regression of restatement/ the
regression of non-timely filing and audit fess. ***, **, * represent the p-value is smaller than 1%, 5%,
and 10%, respectively.
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Table 6 L evel o f  busyness on audit outcome
VARIABLES RESTATE GAAP InNONtimely InFee
SlightXBusyAuditor (pi) 0.074 0.130*** 0.053***
(0.826) (4.263) (3.134)
HeavyXBusyAuditor (|32) 0.182** 0.037 -0.046***
(2.057) (1.172) (-2.583)
logAT 0.105*** -0.026*** 0.487***
(5.767) (-5.241) (101.362)
BTM 0.003 -0.031*** -0.017***
(0.195) (-4.584) (-5.163)
lagLOSS 0.039 -0.018 0.096***
(0.681) (-1.103) (9.189)
LOSS 0.114* 0.127*** 0.073***
(1.947) (7.379) (6.684)
FOREIGN 0.116* 0.083*** 0.243***
(1.650) (4.872) (14.535)
LEVERAGE 0.003 0.132*** 0.066***
(0.060) (5.433) (5.782)
lagROA -0.104** -0 .0 1 0 0.006
(-2 .2 2 0 ) (-0.456) (0.534)
ROA -0.054 -0 114*** -0 .1 1 2***
(-1.207) (-4.560) (-9.486)
RZscore -0.158 -0.064** 0.066**
(-1.337) (-1.984) (2.349)
LocalAudit -0.183** -0.124*** 0.034*
(-2.392) (-5.331) (1.825)
AOTenure -0.014* -0.016*** -0.003
(-1.721) (-8.719) (-1.602)
client_importance -0.071 0 .2 1 1 *** 0.392***
(-0.557) (5.973) (11.508)
clientele size -0 .0 0 1 0 .0 0 1 ** 0.005***
(-0.293) (2.280) (10.449)
industry_specialist 0.052 0.061*** 0 .1 0 2***
(0.656) (3.418) (5.059)
Big4 -0 .021 0.009 0.322***
(-0.263) (0.453) (16.384)
Constant -2.486*** 0.513*** 9.032***
(-3.079) (2.843) (45.421)
Observations 22,504 22,532 22,533
PseudoR2/R2 0.032 0.131 0.857
F-statistic for testing (31-[32=0 0.97 5.43 20.06
(p=0.32) (p<0.05) (p<0 .0 1 )
Year FE YES YES YES
Industry FE YES YES YES
Remarks: t-statistics/ z-statistics are reported in parentheses for the regression of restatement/ the
regression of non-timely filing and audit fess. ***, **, * represent the p-value is smaller than 1%, 5%,
and 10%, respectively.
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Table 7 Industrial specialty and audit outcome
VARIABLES RESTATE GAAP InNONtimely InFee
SpecialistXBusyAuditor (p i) -0.284 0.154** 0.350***
(-1.237) (2.087) (8.651)
nonSpecialistXBusyAuditor (p2) 0.164** 0.076*** -0.029**
(2.293) (3.135) (-2.075)
logAT 0.107*** -0.026*** 0.486***
(5.889) (-5.286) (102.139)
BTM 0.003 -0.031*** -0.017***
(0 .2 0 2 ) (-4.579) (-5.191)
lagLOSS 0.039 -0.019 0.095***
(0.694) (-1.116) (9.150)
LOSS 0.115** 0.127*** 0.072***
(1.968) (7.358) (6.599)
FOREIGN 0.115 0.083*** 0.243***
(1.643) (4.866) (14.649)
LEVERAGE 0.003 0.132*** 0.066***
(0.069) (5.418) (5.761)
lagROA -0.105** -0 .0 1 0 0.006
(-2.241) (-0.444) (0.603)
ROA -0.055 -0.114*** -0 .1 1 1***
(-1.227) (-4.548) (-9.431)
RZscore -0.160 -0.064** 0.067**
(-1.356) (-1.997) (2.390)
LocalAudit -0.184** -0.124*** 0.035*
(-2.405) (-5.317) (1.872)
AOTenure -0.014* -0.016*** -0.003*
(-1.6 8 8 ) (-8.772) (-1.695)
client_importance -0.064 0 .2 1 1 *** 0.388***
(-0.501) (5.965) (11.425)
clientele_size -0 .0 0 1 0 .0 0 1 *** 0.005***
(-0.312) (2.590) (10.673)
industry_specialist 0.066 0.059*** 0.092***
(0.830) (3.304) (4.622)
Big4 -0.029 0 .0 1 2 0 327***
(-0.355) (0.632) (16.735)
Constant -2.484*** 0.512*** 9.028***
(-3.062) (2.852) (46.980)
Observations 22,504 22,532 22,533
PseudoR2/R2 0.032 0.131 0.857
F-statistic for testing pl-p2=0 3.70 1.07 81.27
(P<0.1) (p=0.30) (pO.Ol)
Year FE YES YES YES
Industry FE YES YES YES
Remarks: t-statistics/ z-statistics are reported in parentheses for the regression of restatement/ the
regression of non-timely filing and audit fess. ***, **, * represent the p-value is smaller than 1%, 5%,
and 10%, respectively.
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Table 8 Resource constraints and audit outcome
VARIABLES RESTATE GAAP InNONtimely InFee
Big4XBusyAuditor ([31) 0.075 0 .1 1 1*** 0.055***
(0.927) (4.334) (3.612)
nonBig4XBusyAuditor ([32) 0.265** 0 .0 1 1 -0.196***
(2.334) (0.248) (-7.700)
logAT 0.105*** -0.026*** 0.513***
(6.285) (-5.501) (116.167)
BTM 0.003 -0.031*** -0.018***
(0.198) (-4.588) (-5.261)
lagLOSS 0.039 -0.018 0 .1 0 2***
(0.687) (-1.116) (9.638)
LOSS 0.113* 0.128*** 0.078***
(1.936) (7.399) (6.985)
FOREIGN 0.116* 0.083*** 0.242***
(1.653) (4.866) (14.402)
LEVERAGE 0 .0 0 2 0.132*** 0.065***
(0.053) (5.437) (5.672)
lagROA -0.104** -0 .0 1 0 0.007
(-2 .2 1 0 ) (-0.461) (0.675)
ROA -0.054 -0.115*** -0  H7***
(-1.192) (-4.574) (-9.897)
RZscore -0.158 -0.064** 0.071**
(-1.339) (-1.987) (2.468)
LocalAudit -0.182** -0.124*** 0.065***
(-2.390) (-5.353) (3.443)
AOTenure -0.014* -0.016*** 0.003
(-1.761) (-8.971) (1.343)
client_importance -0.065 0.209*** 0.278***
(-0.526) (6.091) (8.288)
clientele_size -0 .001 0 .0 0 1 ** 0.006***
(-0.303) (2.456) (12.403)
industryspecialist 0.052 0.061*** 0.128***
(0.661) (3.432) (6.432)
Constant -2.501*** 0.519*** 9.067***
(-3.094) (2.879) (47.238)
Observations 22,504 22,532 22,533
PseudoR2/R2 0.032 0.131 0.852
F-statistic fortesting [3l-p2=0 2 .11 4.08 78.98
(p=0.15) (p<0.05) (p<0 .0 1 )
Year FE YES YES YES
Industry FE YES YES YES
Remarks: t-statistics/ z-statistics are reported in parentheses for the regression of restatement/ the
regression of non-timely filing and audit fess. ***, **, * represent the p-value is smaller than 1%, 5%,
and 10%, respectively.
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Table 9 Familiarity with c lien t’s  business operation and  audit outcome
VARIABLES_________________________ RESTATE GAAP lnNONtimely lnFee
nonFirstEngagementXBusyAuditor (|3l) 0.115 0.056** 0 .0 1 2
(1.521) (2.356) (0.828)
FirstEngagementXBusyAuditor ((32) 0.253* 0.218*** -0.038
(1.878) (3.337) (-1.229)
logAT 0 .1 0 0 *** -0.026*** 0.487***
(5.325) (-4.824) (97.548)
BTM 0.007 -0.033*** -0.018***
(0.490) (-4.639) (-5.114)
lagLOSS 0.043 -0.015 0.094***
(0.733) (-0.864) (8.674)
LOSS 0.116* 0.118*** 0.078***
(1.915) (6.415) (6.916)
FOREIGN 0.108 0.086*** 0.237***
(1.518) (4.749) (13.948)
LEVERAGE 0.009 0.128*** 0.067***
(0.218) (5.126) (5.780)
lagROA -0 .1 0 2 ** -0 .011 0 .0 0 1
(-2.118) (-0.493) (0.084)
ROA -0.049 -0.113*** -0.108***
(-1.062) (-4.388) (-9.198)
RZscore -0.168 -0.077** 0.082***
(-1.377) (-2.233) (2.860)
LocalAudit -0.190** -0.134*** 0.042**
(-2.401) (-5.342) (2.174)
AOTenure -0.014* -0.016*** -0.003
(-1.645) (-8.098) (-1.249)
clientimportance -0 .1 0 1 0.219*** 0.376***
(-0.764) (5.788) (10.655)
clientele size -0 .0 0 2 0 .0 0 1 *** 0.005***
(-0.846) (2.763) (9.644)
industry_specialist 0.046 0.066*** 0.103***
(0.562) (3.425) (4.991)
Big4 0.006 0.014 0,354***
(0.072) (0.635) (16.493)
Constant -2.432*** 0.627*** 9.975***
(-2.883) (3.097) (49.006)
Observations 20,576 20,601 20,602
PseudoR2/R2 0.032 0.131 0.861
F-statistic for testing pi-p2=0 0.94 5.92 2.40
(p=0.33) (p<0.05) (p=0 .12 )
Year FE YES YES YES
Industry FE YES YES YES
Remarks: t-statistics/ z-statistics are reported in parentheses for the regression of restatement/
regression of non-timely filing and audit fess. ***, **, * represent the p-value is smaller than 1%, 5%, 
and 10%, respectively.
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Table 10 A udit Office with clients located in major disaster states
VARIABLES RESTATE GAAP InNONtimely InFee
nonMajorDisasterXBusyAuditor ((31) -0.126 0.135*** -0.006
(-1.029) (2.974) (-0.236)
MajorDisasterXBusyAuditor ((32) 0.215*** 0.063** 0.005
(2.770) (2.538) (0.340)
logAT 0.105*** -0.026*** 0.488***
(5.788) (-5.238) (101.377)
BTM 0.003 -0.031*** -0.017***
(0 .2 1 0 ) (-4.583) (-5.146)
lagLOSS 0.038 -0.018 0.095***
(0.680) (-1.106) (9.171)
LOSS 0.114* 0.127*** 0.072***
(1.943) (7.372) (6.663)
FOREIGN 0.115 0.083*** 0.242***
(1.636) (4.872) (14.524)
LEVERAGE 0.003 0.132*** 0.066***
(0.081) (5.416) (5.741)
lagROA -0.105** -0 .0 1 0 0.006
(-2 .2 2 2 ) (-0.447) (0.546)
ROA -0.055 -0 114*** -0 .1 1 2 ***
(-1.2 2 0 ) (-4.547) (-9.472)
RZscore -0.157 -0.065** 0.065**
(-1.334) (-2.006) (2.316)
LocalAudit -0.182** -0.124*** 0.034*
(-2.376) (-5.326) (1.836)
AOTenure -0.014* -0.016*** -0.003*
(-1.719) (-8.756) (-1.650)
client_importance -0.071 0 .2 1 2 *** 0.393***
(-0.553) (5.986) (11.538)
clientele size -0 .0 0 1 0 .0 0 1 *** 0.005***
(-0.377) (2.644) (10.782)
industry_specialist 0.061 0.059*** 0 .1 0 2 ***
(0.770) (3.303) (5.067)
Big4 -0.026 0 .0 1 2 0.325***
(-0.324) (0.617) (16.540)
Constant -2  4 7 7 *** 0.511*** 9.033***
(-3.062) (2.842) (45.699)
Observations 22,504 22,532 22,533
PseudoR2/R2 0.032 0.131 0.857
F-statistic for testing (3l-p2=0 6.62 2.24 0.17
(p<0.05) (p=0.13) (p=0 .6 8 )
Year FE YES YES YES
Industry FE YES YES YES
Remarks: t-statistics/ z-statistics are reported in parentheses for the regression of restatement/ the
regression of non-timely filing and audit fess. ***, **, * represent the p-value is smaller than 1%, 5%,
and 10%, respectively.
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Table 11 Robustness test on adding audit firm  fix e d  effect
VARIABLES____________ RESTATE GAAP InNONtimely InFee
BusyAuditor 0.101 0.048** 0.036***
(1.400) (2.055) (2.760)
logAT 0.084*** -0.013*** 0.448***
(4.173) (-2.715) (81.470)
BTM 0.009 -0.030*** -0 .0 2 0 ***
(0.639) (-4.505) (-6.655)
lagLOSS 0.033 -0.017 0.073***
(0.568) (-1.045) (7.362)
LOSS 0.127** 0.138*** 0.056***
(2.133) (8.089) (5.481)
FOREIGN 0.123* 0.082*** 0.235***
(1.721) (4.971) (14.482)
LEVERAGE 0.014 0.098*** 0.088***
(0.285) (4.268) (8.980)
lagROA -0.065 0.013 -0.030***
(-1.205) (0.653) (-3.371)
ROA -0.038 -0 .1 0 1 *** -0.126***
(-0.741) (-4.277) (-12.230)
RZscore -0.165 -0.049 0.055**
(-1.328) (-1.568) (2.079)
LocalAudit -0.115 -0.074*** -0 .021
(-1.377) (-3.327) (-1 .12 0)
AOTenure -0.009 -0.016*** -0 .0 0 2
(-1.146) (-9.098) (-0.936)
client_importance -0.005 0.134*** 0.706***
(-0.033) (3.884) (17.324)
clientelejsize -0 .0 0 1 0 .0 0 1 *** 0.006***
(-0.581) (3.021) (11.756)
industry_specialist -0.054 0.070*** 0.098***
(-0.647) (3.743) (4.839)
Big4 -0.282 1.281*** 0.646***
(-0.243) (7.816) (6.077)
Constant -2.006 -0.833*** 8.894***
(-1.457) (-3.353) (40.442)
Observations 21,670 22,532 22,533
PseudoR2/R2 0.051 0.190 0.877
Year FE YES YES YES
Industry FE YES YES YES
Audit firm FE YES YES YES
Remarks: t-statistics/ z-statistics are reported in parentheses for the regression of restatement/ 
regression of non-timely filing and audit fess. ***, **, * represent the p-value is smaller than 1%,:
and 10%, respectively.
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Table 12 Robustness test on using alternative m easures o f  audit quality
VARIABLES abs DAM abs DAM adjusted GC issuance Type 1 error Type2error
BusyAuditor 0.009** 0.010*** 0.204 0.253* -0.204
(2.102) (2.618) (0.808) (1.711) (-0.808)
logAT -0.009*** -0.008*** -0.347*** -0.591*** 0.347***
(-7.159) (-7.659) (-6.225) (-13.401) (6.225)
BTM -0.008*** -0.007*** -0.126*** -0.242*** 0.126***
(-5.036) (-4.951) (-4.515) (-10.460) (4.515)
lagLOSS -0 .0 2 1 *** -0.015*** 0.594** 0.681*** -0.594**
(-6.927) (-5.171) (2.289) (5.396) (-2.289)
LOSS -0.032*** -0.024*** 1.297 1.018*** -1.297
(-9.058) (-7.411) (0.620) (7.119) (-0.620)
FOREIGN -0.003 -0 .0 0 1 0.225 -0.052 -0.225
(-0.979) (-0.216) (0.856) (-0.360) (-0.856)
LEVERAGE 0.030*** 0.019** 0.069 0.497*** -0.069
(3.811) (2.561) (0.724) (3.861) (-0.724)
lagROA -0 .10 2*** -0.090*** -0.077 -0.213*** 0.077
(-12.179) (-11.312) (-0.990) (-3.274) (0.990)
ROA -0.078*** -0.063*** -0.217** -0.433*** 0.217**
(-9.096) (-8.019) (-2.374) (-4.222) (2.374)
RZscore 0 .0 2 1 *** 0.007 -1.114*** -1.723*** \ H4***
(3.537) (1.288) (-3.490) (-9.111) (3.490)
LocalAudit -0 .0 0 2 -0.003 -0.196 -0.313** 0.196
(-0.424) (-0.704) (-1.089) (-2.485) (1.089)
AOTenure -0 .0 0 0 -0 .0 0 0 -0.032 -0 .1 1 1 *** 0.032
(-0.099) (-0 .0 0 1 ) (-1.064) (-6.321) (1.064)
client_importance 0.018** 0.013* 0.401 0.268 -0.401
(2.322) (1.830) (1.213) (1.242) (-1.213)
clientele size -0 .0 0 0 -0 .0 0 0 0 .001 -0 .0 0 2 -0 .001
(-1.027) (-0.876) (0.229) (-0.757) (-0.229)
industry_specialist 0 .0 0 2 -0 .0 0 2 0.018 0.164 -0.018
(0.896) (-0.770) (0.052) (0.998) (-0.052)
Big4 -0.026*** -0.025*** -0 .2 1 0 0.274** 0 .2 1 0
(-6.597) (-7.117) (-0.915) (2.068) (0.915)
Constant 0.750*** 0.099*** 11.292*** -12.991*** -11.292***
(69.377) (10.281) (4.839) (-26.149) (-4.838)
Observations 20,116 20,116 1 ,666 20,626 1 ,666
PseudoR2/R2 0.480 0.448 0.289 0.423 0.290
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES
Industry FE NO NO YES YES YES
Remarks: z-statistics/ t-statistics are reported in parentheses for the regressions of discretionary 
accruals/ the regression of going concern issuance. ***, **, * represent the p-value is smaller than 1%, 
5%, and 10%, respectively.
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Table 13 A udit outcom e o f  engagements with affected clients
VARIABLES____________ RESTATE GAAP InNONtimely InFee
Affected_client 0 .0 2 2 -0.041 0.099***
(0.134) (-0.794) (3.044)
BusyAuditor -0.108 0.105* -0.058
(-0.509) (1.650) (-1.402)
logAT 0.113*** -0 .0 2 2 *** 0.503***
(3.529) (-2.811) (70.496)
BTM 0.052 -0.030** -0.016**
(1.622) (-2 .2 1 1 ) (-2.279)
lagLOSS 0.146 0.003 0.085***
(1.397) (0 .11 1) (4.633)
LOSS 0.145 0.133*** 0.075***
(1.387) (4.435) (4.129)
FOREIGN 0.104 0.095*** 0.244***
(0.855) (3.669) (9.800)
LEVERAGE 0.047 0.114** 0.094***
(0.443) (2.323) (4.452)
lagROA -0 .2 0 0 ** -0.006 -0.027
(-2.182) (-0.116) (-1.410)
ROA 0.155 -0.160*** -0.131***
(1.574) (-2.861) (-6.439)
RZscore -0.299 0.064 0.146***
(-1.352) ( 1.2 0 2 ) (3.225)
LocalAudit -0 .2 1 2 -0 .1 0 1 *** 0.040
(-1.564) (-2.963) (1.368)
AOTenure -0.007 -0 .0 1 0 *** -0.003
(-0.515) (-3.698) (-1.126)
client_importance -0.276 0.226*** 0  4 4 7 ***
(-1.173) (3.675) (8.878)
clientele_size 0.003 0 .0 0 1 0.005***
(1.055) (1.329) (7.539)
industry_specialist 0.189 0.036 0.119***
(1.554) (1.545) (4.553)
Big4 -0 .0 0 1 0.035 0.244***
(-0.008) (1 .100) (8.269)
Constant -1.878* 0.298* 9 324***
(-1.787) (1.694) (41.610)
Observations 6,257 6,326 6,326
PseudoR2/R2 0.048 0.136 0.867
Year FE YES YES YES
Industry FE YES YES YES
Remarks: t-statistics/ z-statistics are reported in parentheses for the regression of restatement/ 
regression of non-timely filing and audit fess. ***, **, * represent the p-value is smaller than 1%,;
and 10%, respectively.
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